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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 11-2608 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CARLOS JACKSON-ESCOLASTICO,  
a/k/a Carlito,  
a/k/a Gillermo Sanchez-Martinez,  
a/k/a J.M.R.,  
a/k/a CACU 
 
Carlos Jackson-Escolastico, 
 
                                                   Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 10-cr-00502) 
District Judge:  Honorable Juan R. Sanchez 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 10, 2012 
 
Before:  FUENTES, HARDIMAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  July 24, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Carlos Jackson-Escolastico (Jackson) appeals his judgment of sentence after 
pleading guilty to making false statements within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.  We 
will affirm. 
I 
 Because we write for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, we recite 
only the essential facts and procedural history. 
An undocumented immigrant and registered confidential source for Homeland 
Security Investigations (HSI), Jackson was deactivated in November 2009 for making 
false statements to the agency concerning his complicity in a conspiracy to rob drug 
dealers in Philadelphia.  In August 2010, Jackson was charged in an information with 
making a false statement within the jurisdiction of HSI in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.  
He pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement, in which he stipulated that he had 
committed other crimes—including robbery and heroin distribution—while acting as a 
confidential informant.  The plea agreement allowed both parties to seek a departure or 
variance under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. 
 At sentencing, the District Court rejected Jackson‟s objections to the presentence 
investigation report (PSR) and adopted the PSR‟s calculation of the Guidelines range at 
33 to 41 months, based on a total offense level of 17.  The Court then varied upward, 
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imposing a sentence of 60 months‟ imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a 
special assessment of $100.  Jackson timely appealed. 
II 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review Jackson‟s sentence 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  We review the procedural and substantive 
reasonableness of Jackson‟s sentence for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Doe, 617 
F.3d 766, 769 (3d Cir. 2010).  Procedural reasonableness requires “the sentencing court 
[to] give „rational and meaningful consideration‟ to the relevant [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) 
factors.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc)). 
 “Substantive reasonableness inquires into „whether the final sentence, wherever it may 
lie within the permissible statutory range, was premised upon appropriate and judicious 
consideration of the relevant factors.‟”  Id. at 770 (quoting United States v. Schweitzer, 
454 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
 Jackson first argues that the District Court erred by imposing an “unnecessary, 
unreasonable and overly severe” term of imprisonment, and he claims that the District 
Court unduly emphasized some § 3553(a) factors over others.  Insofar as this constitutes a 
challenge to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, we find it unpersuasive; the 
sentencing transcript indicates that the Court properly considered all relevant factors.  Nor 
do we find any merit in Jackson‟s contention that his sentence was substantively 
unreasonable.  As the District Court noted, Jackson‟s false statements not only made 
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prosecution of the robbery conspiracy more time-consuming and ultimately led to the 
issuance of an incorrect indictment, but they also jeopardized the safety of the 
investigating agents.  The District Court‟s decision to vary above the Guidelines range 
based on Jackson‟s criminal history and the seriousness of his offense reflects its view 
that a lesser sentence would not deter him from unlawful conduct.  We agree with the 
District Court that Jackson‟s offense was worse than the typical violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1001.  Moreover, Jackson‟s criminal history—which includes identity theft, false 
representation of United States citizenship, robbery, and drug distribution—supports the 
District Court‟s conclusion that Jackson represents a continuing threat to public safety.  
Accordingly, we cannot say that “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the 
same sentence on [Jackson] for the reasons the district court provided.”  United States v. 
Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
III 
 Jackson also argues that the District Court erred by imposing a sentence of 
supervised release.  The Government concedes that Jackson‟s appellate waiver does not 
bar him from challenging his term of imprisonment but argues that the waiver prevents us 
from reviewing the reasonableness of his supervised release.  Because we must consider 
Jackson‟s appeal of his above-Guideline sentence, we choose not to determine whether 
the term of supervised release falls within the ambit of his appellate waiver.  Even giving 
Jackson the benefit of the doubt by assuming that he has not waived this argument, we 
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readily conclude that, in light of Jackson‟s extensive criminal history, the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in imposing three years of supervised release.  Therefore, we 
will affirm Jackson‟s judgment of sentence in its entirety. 
